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Abstract
Most of the formalizations of the Inclusive Fitness and Kin Selection con-
cepts contain two highly simplifying assumptions (which actually complicate the
problem): first, is that the models are described in terms of ”fitness”, an abstract
parameter vaguely related to the population growth rate or expected reproduc-
tive success. The second is that they ignore the division between Donors and
Receivers of altruism and the distribution of those roles in the population. In
this paper the Inclusive Fitness and Kin Selection approaches instead of unclear
fitness units, will be expressed by explicit demographic parameters describing
the probability of death during focal interaction when cooperative trait can be
exhibited. This will allow for more mechanistic insight into impact of the co-
operative actions on the population dynamics. In addition, new framework will
take into account the distribution of the roles of Donor or the Receiver in the
population. This description will be used for the derivation of the population
growth model describing the competition between Cooperative and Noncooper-
ative strategies. The obtained approach will be sufficient for description of the
cases when the roles are independently drawn during each interaction. However,
we can imagine situations when survival and the change of the role are not cor-
related (such as food support for the infected individual, which keeps him alive,
but cannot cure). To cover those cases, new model is extended to the case with
explicit dynamics of the role distributions among carriers of different strategies,
driven by some general mechanisms. In effect it is shown that even in the case
when fluxes between roles are driven by selectively neutral mechanisms (acting
in the same way on all strategies), the differences in the mortalities in the focal
interaction will lead to different distributions of roles for different strategies.
This leads to more complex rules for cooperation than the classical Hamilton’s
rule, that in addition to the classical Cost and Benefit contain third component
weighted by difference in proportions of Donors among carriers of both strate-
gies. Depending on the sign, this component can be termed ”selfishness bonus”
(when it decreases the benefit) which describes the benefit of not taking a risk
related to altruist action, or ”sacrifice bonus” (when it decreases the cost) which
describes the benefit of sacrifice if the Receiver’s survival exceeds the survival
of helping Donor.
1 Introduction
Kin selection and inclusive fitness are described as the one of the most impor-
tant and influential concepts in modern evolutionary biology. These concepts are
popular in many disciplines where evolutionary reasoning is used, such as evo-
lutionary psychology. On the other hand, those approaches are probably most
misunderstood concepts in modern science (Park 2007, West et al. 2011). Also
limits of their applicability are subject of ongoing debate (Fletcher et al. 2006,
Wenseleers 2006, Doebeli and Hauert 2006, West et al 2007, Van Veelen 2009).
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After the paper by Nowak et al. (2010) the debate exploded with astonishing
intensity (Rousset and Lion 2011, Gardner et al. 2011, Allen 2015, Kramer
and Meunier 2016, Okasha and Martens 2016, Allen and Nowak 2016, van Vee-
len 2017, Birch 2017). Very briefly summarizing the actual state of the debate:
most of researchers agree that for the spread of the altruistic gene famous Hamil-
ton’s rule Cost < Relatedness ∗ Benefit should be satisfied, but there is huge
disagreement on what Cost, Benefit and Relatedness actually means. Differ-
ent approaches assume different definitions of those parameters using the same
words. For example, relatedness is often defined as the probability that the Re-
ceiver carry the cooperative gene (Nowak 2006), or as the regression coefficient
in more complex genetic approaches (Grafen 2006), or as in many cases it may
be not explained at all. It does not mean that those different approaches are
wrong. They probably have some limitations, but they are simply mutually
incompatible due to differences in their basic assumptions. Surprising is that
the basic underlying idea, that the cooperative behaviour of the individual may
support the spread of the cooperative genes carried by other individuals, is quite
simple, clear and inspiring. However, the debate on this topic becomes more and
more complicated and hermetic and in effect the mathematical formulations are
very complicated too, which leads to the situation when basic questions about
a meaning and a sense of these concepts are still open (Marshall 2016).
This leads to the question: can we formalize the initial simple intuition in
a simple and mechanistic way, under minimum set of assumptions, that it will
be accessible for moderately smart undergraduate student, after basic course on
mathematical biology and evolutionary game theory?
The problems described above may be caused by two aspects common for the
used complex mathematical approaches: in most cases the models are expressed
in terms of vaguely defined ”fitness” parameter related to reproductive success
or instantaneous growth rate (Roff 2008, Metz 2008). In effect an important
aspect, which is the distinction between two states (roles), active Donor and
passive Receiver (or Receivers) is not sufficiently addressed. In this paper we
will focus on these issues. Some light on this problem can be cast by appli-
cation of the following methods from evolutionary game theory. The classical
evolutionary games consists of the game structure associated by replicator dy-
namics (Maynard Smith 1982; Cressman 1992; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988,
1998) This approach is mainly based on the simple matrix games, where payoff
matrices describe the excess from the average growth rate in the population for
the respective strategies. To add necessary ecological details and to describe the
models in measurable parameters the classical approach was expressed in terms
of the demographic vital rates (Argasinski and Broom 2012, 2013; Zhang and
Hui 2011; Huang et al. 2015, Gokhale and Hauert 2016). In this approach in-
stead of single payoff function there are separate payoff functions describing the
mortality and fertility. Similar explicit consideration of opposed mortality and
fertility forces as the cornerstone of the mechanistic formulation of evolutionary
theory was proposed by Doebeli and Ispolatov (2017). Probably the most of
considered cases will be related to some danger and will have no direct repro-
ductive output. Therefore, in the problems related to inclusive fitness or kin
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altruism we will rather use mortality payoffs to describe costs of sacrifice of the
Donor individual and benefits resulting from rescue of the Receiver. However,
this framework will be not sufficient for description of the analyzed problem.
The proposed approach is still based on a very strong simplifying assumption.
The individuals (and thus their payoffs) differ only by inherited strategy and the
individuals carrying the same strategy are completely equivalent. Thus births
and deaths are not the only currency in which are paid payoffs in evolution-
ary games. The alternative approach to game theoretic modelling, dealing with
the problem of not heritable differences between individuals carrying the same
genes was introduced in Houston and McNamara (1999). In the state based
approach the individual differences caused by environmental conditions are ex-
plicitly taken into consideration. Individuals and their payoffs are determined
by their actual state or situation. In terms of the analyzed problem this will
be the distinction between Donors and Receivers of the altruistic action. The
distinction between those two states (or roles) leads to the question about dis-
tribution of states among individuals carrying different strategies and its impact
on the selection mechanism. This is the second question of this paper. In ad-
dition the distribution of roles may be product of some underlying dynamical
process.
Therefore, the goals of the paper are following. In the first part of the paper
we will express the classic inclusive fitness and kin selection frameworks in demo-
graphic parameters (probability of death during interaction) instead of vaguely
defined fitness units. We will start from the standard simplifying assumptions
used in evolutionary game theory such as well mixed population, to see their
limitations and to find ways how to overcome them. The obtained framework
will be embedded in population dynamics model with explicit distribution of
states (or roles such as passive Receiver and active Donor). Then, in the second
part of the paper, we will extend the obtained model to the case when the dis-
tribution of states is not constant, but is the product of some dynamical process
(fluxes between roles of Receiver and Donor), which will be described by respec-
tive additional equations. Then we will derive the general rule for cooperation
from the dynamic model.
List of important symbols:
nis -number of individuals in state i with strategy s
Ris -growth rate of individuals in state i with strategy s
Λi -intensity of leaving the state i
qis = n
i
s/
∑
j n
j
s -frequency of individuals in state i among individuals with
strategy s
gs -frequency of all s-strategists
Rb -background growth rate
dis -mortality of individuals in state i with strategy s
lower index indicates strategy C-Cooperative N -Noncooperative
upper index indicates state D-Donor R-Receiver
dR(s)-mortality of passive receivers, depending on the strategy of the Donor
C = dDC − dDN -cost of Donor
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B = dRs (N)− dRs (C) -benefit for Receiver
τf -intensity of the focal type of interaction
x -maximal number of Receivers that can benefit from single cooperative
action performed by Donor
O -number of Receivers per single cooperating Donor
Q =
x
O
-probability of being affected by cooperator
pC -probability that Receiver will interact with Cooperator
pN -probability that noncooperative Receiver will be helped by Cooperator
1.1 Basic assumptions of the event based modelling and
demographic game approach
The event based approach focused on the explicit dynamics of the interaction
events in time and the aggregation of their outcomes was introduced in Argasin-
ski and Broom (2012) and later extended and clarified (Argasinski and Broom
2017,2018). For derivation of the growth equation we can use the method from
Argasinski and Broom (2017). We can derive the vital rates (birth and death
rates) from interaction rates and demographic parameters describing the number
of offspring and the probability of death in the single interaction. Assume that
individuals are involved in the different types of interaction events described by
demographic outcomes (mortality and fertility). The general growth equation
of the subpopulation of individuals with strategy s (described by the subscript
s while superscript j will describe event type will be:
n˙s = ns
∑
j
τ j
(
W js − djs
)
(1)
where
τ j is the interaction rate of j-th type event,
W js is the fertility payoff (number of offspring) in j-th type event,
djs is the mortality payoff in j-th type event,
The analyzed trait under selection, described by different strategies, may affect
few or even one type of interaction (we will limit to this case). This interaction
will be described as the focal game (described by τf , W fs and d
f
s ). In most basic
cases the altruist action can be expressed in terms of the average mortality dfs
(or equivalently survival) of the individual carrying strategy s. Other types of
events will constitute the background fitness, the same for all strategies
Rb =
∑
j 6=f τ
j
(
W js − djs
)
τf
.
Some of the background events may depend on the population size, thus the
Rb parameter may be the function describing the density dependent effects (for
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simplicity we will not describe this explicitly). This will lead to the basic growth
equation
n˙s = nsτ
f
(
Rb − dfs
)
, (2)
where τf can be removed by the change of the timescale. In the next section
we will focus on the structure of the focal interaction.
2 Framework with explicit distinction between
Donor and Receiver subpopulations
In this section we will develop a more detailed equivalent of the ”donation game”
(Marshall 2015), a game model of altruist sacrifice, expressed in differences in
mortality and taking into account explicit distribution of roles of Receiver and
Donor among individuals. In the considered case we have two states: Active
Donor of the altruism and passive Receivers of the altruistic behaviour. Ac-
cording to the classical examples such as ladybirds or signaling of the predator
threat, we will have trade-offs between mortality of Donors and the expected
survival of the Receivers. In this case background growth rate Rb should be
the same in both states. We have two roles or states of individuals (Donor and
Receiver) and two competing strategies (Cooperative and Noncooperative) The
Receiver’s mortality payoff is independent of the carried strategy, while Donors
can exhibit two types of behaviour Cooperate (pay the cost) described by sub-
script C or Defect (don’t pay the cost) described by subscript N , thus the payoff
of the Donors will be dDN and d
D
C . Then the cost can be expressed as
C = dDC − dDN > 0 thus dDC = dDN + C. (3)
Since Receivers are passive, their payoff functions will be the same. Single
Receiver of the cooperative behaviour will have payoff dR(C) in comparison to
the the Receiver not affected by cooperative behaviour which will have mortality
dR(N). Since dR(N) > dR(C) we can define the benefit of the Receiver as
B = dRs (N)− dRs (C) > 0
(leading to dRs (C) = d
R
s (N) − B since benefit means decrease in mortality).
Above payoffs describe outcomes of the pairwise interactions between Donors
playing different strategies and Receivers. However, in some cases such as preda-
tor warning signal, single Cooperative Donor can alarm few Receivers with dif-
ferent strategies. Assume that x is the number of Receivers that can be affected
by the behaviour of the single Donor. The question arises about the resulting
probability of being affected by the cooperator for the average Receiver. This
needs the description of the population state. Assume that gC is the fraction of
Cooperators in the population. In addition for both strategies we have the same
constant distribution of states (the exceptions from this assumption are subject
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of the second part of the paper) described by qD (while qR = 1 − qD is the
fraction of Receivers). Then the number of the Receivers per single cooperating
Donor in the population is
O =
(
1− qD)
gCqD
, (4)
thus the probability of being affected by Cooperator will be
Q =
x
O
=
gCq
Dx
(1− qD) ≤ 1 (5)
(in the case when this factor exceeds 1 we can assume that the whole population
can receive the benefit and replace factor Q by 1). Then the mortality payoff
of the Receiver can be described as
dR(g, qD) = QdR(C) + (1−Q) dR(N)
= Q
(
dR(N)−B)+ dR(N)−QdR(N)
= dR(N)−QB (6)
After substitution of Q (5) we have:
dR(g, qD) = dR(N)− gCq
D
(1− qD)xB
(
dR(N)−B for Q = 1)
In effect we have static strategic description of the modelled type of interaction
which can be embedded in the more general dynamic model. Since our initial
focal interaction is described by mortalities only but expressed for different
states, the average focal interaction mortality payoff will be
dfs = q
DdDs +
(
1− qD) dR(g, qD),
and qD is the conditional probability of acting as Donor when focal interaction
occurs.
2.1 Population growth
This will lead to the following form of the growth equation (2) after removal of
τf
n˙s = ns
(
Rb −
[
qDdDs +
(
1− qD) dR(g, qD)]) , (7)
Note that in the context of the population growth, the per capita benefit (the
same for both strategies) is not constant in time but it depends on the fraction
of the Cooperators. Only cooperators pay the cost C. This will lead to the
following system of the growth equations (7) for both strategies. Therefore,
growth equations for Cooperators and noncooperators will be:
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n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) (dR(N)−QB)+ qDC])
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) (dR(N)−QB)]) .
Substitution of Q (5) for Q < 1 leads to
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD)(dR(N)− gCqD
(1− qD)xB
)
+ qDC
])
= nC
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qD (dDN − gCxB + C)])
for Cooperators and for Noncooperators we have exactly the same equation as
above but without the cost term qDC leading to the system
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qD (dDN − gCxB + C)]) (8)
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qD (dDN − gCxB)]) (9)
Note that change in the growth rate for Cooperators, described by factor gCq
DxB−
qDC in effect of the altruistic behaviour should be positive. This leads to the
formula gCxB > C where gC describes the actual fraction of the Cooperators
in the population and xB describes the aggregated benefit caused by action of
single cooperator. However, growth rate of the Defectors is nearly the same as
for Cooperators. The only difference is lack of factor qDC describing costs of al-
truistic behaviour. Thus it is clear that selfish individuals will always dominate
the altruistic strategy. Even if the cooperative strategy obtained fixation, the
selfish mutant can successfully invades the population. This is caused by the
fact that our Cooperative strategy acts randomly with every partner. We know
from the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma models that this approach described
there as the Sucker strategy is not the best option. What happens when we
allow Cooperative strategies to be more choosy?
2.2 In panmictic populations Cooperators should be a lit-
tle bit smarter
Let us assume that the Cooperators want to help other Cooperators and that
they can guess the strategy of the randomly drawn partner with probability r.
We will not specify here underlying mechanism for altruism (kin, based on reci-
procity etc.). We want to build the top-down model describing the population
mechanisms determining selection. Therefore, Cooperating Receiver will receive
help witj probability Qr, while Noncooperative Receiver will receive help with
probability Q (1− r). In this case, similarly to (6), the impact on the Receiver
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will be different for both strategies:
dRC(g, q) = Qrd
R(C) + (1−Qr) dR(N) (10)
= dR(N)−QrB(
dR(N)− rB for Q = 1) ,
dRN (g, q) = Q (1− r) dR(C) + (1−Q (1− r)) dR(N)
= dR(N)−Q (1− r)B (11)(
dR(N)− (1− r)B for Q = 1) ,
after substitution of Q (5) for Q < 1 we have
dRC(g, q) = d
R(N)− gCq
D
(1− qD)xrB
dRN (g, q) = d
R(N)− gCq
D
(1− qD)x (1− r)B,
thus in addition to the previous derivations, B should be multiplied by r in the
Cooperators payoff dRC and by (1− r) in Noncooperators payoff dRN .
2.3 Population growth
This leads to the following equations analogous to (8,9):
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) (dR(N)−QrB)+ qDC])
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) (dR(N)−Q (1− r)B)]) ,
which can be presented as
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) dR(N)]+ (1− qD)QrB − qDC)
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[
qDdDN +
(
1− qD) dR(N)]+ (1− qD)Q (1− r)B) ,
Above equations differ in terms(
1− qD)QrB − qDC for Cooperators, (12)(
1− qD)Q (1− r)B for Noncooperators. (13)
After substitution of Q (5) we have
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qD (dDN − gCxrB + C)]) (14)
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qD (dDN − gCx (1− r)B)]) (15)
or equivalently
n˙C = nC
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qDdDN]+ qD (gCxrB − C))
n˙N = nN
(
Rb −
[(
1− qD) dR(N) + qDdDN]+ qDgCx (1− r)B)
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The factors that are different for both strategies are
gCxrB − C for Cooperators, (16)
gCx(1− r)B for Noncooperators, (17)
both multiplied by qD.
2.4 Rule for cooperation
Thus the rule for the positive effect of the altruistic action on the growth rate
of the cooperators will be
gCxrB − C > 0 or
(
1− qD) rB − qDC > 0 for Q = 1,
since the change (16) (or equivalently (12)) should be positive, leading to
gCxrB > C or
(
1− qD)
qD
rB > C for Q = 1, (18)
where gCr describes the fraction of the correctly recognized Cooperators among
randomly drawn Receivers. Note the similarity to the Hamilton’s rule (especially
when qD = 0.5), which may be misleading (this aspect will be analyzed in the
discussion) The above rule depends on the fraction of cooperative individuals
in the population. Now let us check the condition for the dominance of the
Cooperators over the Defectors where (16) is greater than (17). This can be
described by condition
gCx(1− r)B < gCxrB − C.
For Q = 1 ((12) greater than (13)) it will be(
1− qD) (1− r)B < (1− qD) rB − qDC,
which means that increase of the growth rate caused by altruistic behaviour
should be greater for Cooperators than for Defectors. Above condition leads to
C < (2r − 1) gCxB or C < (2r − 1)
(
1− qD)
qD
B, for Q = 1,
or generally to
C < (2r − 1)
(
1− qD)
qD
QB, (19)
where Q =
gCq
Dx
(1− qD) for Q < 1 (20)
which can be termed General Hamilton’s Rule since this is the background for
derivation the classical kin selection rule. The above condition can be satisfied
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only for r > 0.5 which is reasonable, because it means that the strategy should
support more Cooperators than Defectors. The above formula can be described
in the form
C < [r − (1− r)]
(
1− qD)
qD
B, (21)
where r is the probability that the Cooperating Donor will help Cooperating
Receiver and (1− r) is the probability that the Noncooperative Receiver will
receive help from Cooperating Donor. Factor gCx (or
(
1− qD) /qD for Q = 1)
describes the number of helped Receivers resulting from cooperative action. The
obtained condition definitely make sense, however it is not surprising at all. This
formula (or similar) can be found in many papers (for example McElreath and
Boyd 2008, Fletcher and Doebeli 2008, Alger and Weibull 2012). Note that,
the above conditions introduced in this section describe the average outcome
of the random encounters. When the frequency of cooperators is low then the
value of Q is also close to zero making the spread of the cooperative behaviour
impossible. Therefore, the classical game theoretic perspective focused on the
outcomes of the average interaction is not sufficient for the explanation of the
evolution of the altruistic behaviour. Cooperative strategies should be able to
overcome the randomness resulting from the pure frequency dependent selection.
This aspect was analyzed in the literature. Some authors assume existence of
some assortment mechanism pairing Cooperators more likely with Cooperators
( McElreath and Boyd 2008, Fletcher and Doebeli 2008). Note that when the
assumption of panmictic population is relaxed, the probabilities r and 1−r may
result from some population processes responsible for assortment. Indeed, this
assortment can be realized by very simple mechanism.
2.5 Cooperators should stay together and care about them-
selves
Since the framework developed in the previous sections was based on frequency
dependent game structure, survivors of the focal interaction split up and lonely
look for another random encounters. If the frequency of Cooperators is low, then
the chance of receiving the help from another Cooperator is small. The solution
of this problem is to follow the confirmed Cooperator and to support him when
he acts as the Receiver. This will lead to aggregation of the cooperative groups,
where the value of Q will be significantly greater than those resulting from the
purely random encounters. When we assume some phenomenological probability
pg of receiving help from some member of self-supporting group of Cooperators
then the probability of receiving help can be presented as
Q =
x
O
= pg + (1− pg) gCq
Dx
(1− qD) ≤ 1. (22)
When cooperative groups are large enough, then the problem of elimination
of free-riding Noncooperators emerges. Correctly recognized free riders will
be not helped, however in some cases, such as predator alarm signals, they can
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benefit from the general cooperative action towards other Cooperators. In these
cases, recognized free-riders should be expelled from the group (or even killed),
however this aspects will be no explored in this work. Increase of the frequency
of the cooperative strategy gC (leading to Q = 1) potentially allows for the
increase of trust in the population, since every Donor can receive help from
randomly met Cooperator. This may lead to the transition from the population
of the cooperating subgroups to the general cooperative population where group
formation is not necessary. However, this transition may be impossible if the
cooperative groups are too xenophobic. This is the interesting question for
the future research. On the other hand, when the frequency of cooperators is
low, the potential cooperators can be found among kins and that’s why the
most important structures in the evolution of social mechanisms are family
relationships based on kinship.
2.6 The Kin selection case
In this special case interactions are limited to the close kins only. Thus instead
of guessing the strategy of the Receiver with probability r, Donors support only
kins of degree k (then rk is the probability that both actors share the altru-
ist gene from common ancestor, later referred as kin relatedness). We assume
that the family members stay relatively close and support themselves to keep
the value of Q (22) at the sufficiently high level. Cooperative Donor after kin
recognition will pay the conditional cost C and deliver the conditional benefit
B. However, for different strategies we have different conditional probabilities
that those potential kin donor is a carrier of the altruist gene (pC and pN respec-
tively). Derivation of those probabilities can be found in McElreath and Boyd
(2008). The Receiver carries the same gene from common ancestor with proba-
bility rk, but he can also carry those gene from another source with probability
gC . Similarly kin of noncooperative Receiver will not carry the cooperative gene
with probability rk but it can also carry it from other source with probability
gC . When we limit interactions to the kins of degree rk then
pC = rk(1) + (1− rk)gC and pN = rk(0) + (1− rk)gC (23)
Then Receiver mortality payoffs analogous to (10) and (11) will be:
dRC(g, q) = QpCd
R(C) + (1−QpC) dR(N)
= dR(N)−QpCB
= dR(N)− gCq
D
(1− qD)xpCB
(
dR(N)− pCB for Q = 1
)
(24)
dRN (g, q) = QpNd
R(C) + (1−QpN ) dR(N)
= dR(N)−QpNB
= dR(N)− gCq
D
(1− qD)xpNB
(
dR(N)− pNB for Q = 1
)
. (25)
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Note that the only differences between (10) and (11) and (24) and (25) is
that r is replaced by pC and (1 − r) by pN . Therefore, further derivations are
exactly the same leading to the condition for positive change of growth rate
equivalent to (18):
C < gCpCxB or C <
(
1− qD)
qD
pCB for Q = 1. (26)
After substitution of pC and pN we obtain
C < [rk + (1− rk)gC ] gCxB =
[
rkgC + (1− rk)g2C
]
xB
or
C < [rk + (1− rk)gC ]
(
1− qD)
qD
B for Q = 1. (27)
The condition for greater growth of Cooperators equivalent to (21) will be
C < [pC − pN ]
(
1− qD)
qD
B, (28)
since pC − pN = rk this leads to
rk
(
1− qD)
qD
B > C, (29)
which is the classical Hamilton’s rule. Thus, we expressed the classical the-
ory in terms of demographic outcomes of the focal interaction and described
the impact of the distribution of roles. Therefore, the limitation of altruistic
actions to close kins is the strategy to overcome the pressure of the frequency
dependent selection. It will produce selective advantage independently of the
cooperative gene frequency in the population. The disadvantage is that the
range of possible cooperation is dramatically reduced. From the point of view
of our panmictic population it should be rather regarded as the evolution of
nepotism than altruism, since it refuses to help the non-kins.
3 Summary of part one
Let us summarize the benefits of the obtained new formulation of the classical
theory:
-model explicitly depends on the distribution of roles described by parameter qD
(it can be reduced to the classical case for qD = 0.5). This allows for description
of the cases of the multiple Receivers helped by single Cooperating Donor, thus
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it is not limited to pairwise interactions only (problem mentioned in Nowak et
al. 2010).
-model is expressed in terms of survival of the focal interaction instead of the
abstract fitness expressed in the ”number of offspring equivalents” (as it is de-
fined in Encyclopedia Britannica) or reproductive value (for example Marshall
2015). In the new model reproduction is realized by background growth rate,
and there is no need to take it into account.
-in effect the new approach is fully mechanistic and much simpler. It can be
parameterized by easily measurable demographic parameters. It can be feed by
simple survival statistics instead of the complex and hardly measurable calcu-
lus of offspring unborn due to the death of might-have-been parent, as in the
previous interpretations such as the reproductive value (Nowak et al 2017).
-in the new approach payoffs are obviously linear by definition. There is no
reason that the survival of the cooperative gene carrier should be greater that
those of noncooperative gene carrier, as in the case of nonlinear payoffs (Mar-
shall 2015).
The last advantage is that the new approach allows for generalization presented
in part two of the paper.
4 Rationale for part two: explicit dynamics of
roles
Note that the analysis of the problem of altruism was limited to the simple
system of the exponential growth equations. However the question arises about
the assumption of the constant distribution of roles (Donors versus Receivers) in
the population. In the previous sections the distribution of roles was determined
by conditional probability of acting as Donor or Receiver related to the focal
interaction. This should be correct in many cases when the role is strictly
related to the particular game round and in the next round will be drawn again.
However, it is also possible that the Donor or Receiver role is determined by
some external conditions and cannot be changed in effect of focal interaction.
For example vampire bat foraging in the area where abundance of prey is very
low needs support until he finds the area where prey abundance is high, which
he may exploit for some time period. The altruist behaviour may increase the
survival of the Receiver but it cannot help him in finding the source of food.
In the case of predator warning signal, we can imagine that the population
is structured and divided into two groups of which one is more exposed to
the observation of the threat (for example due to being at the border of the
habitat). However, the exposed individuals according to their strategy can
warn the other individuals or not and after the warning event they can move to
the other location or stay at the border of the habitat. This division may be
not fixed and the individuals may randomly shift between different roles. This
will lead to the separate demographic process and the background switching
dynamics that may depend on the daily movement routines of the individuals.
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Therefore, we can imagine that the distribution of roles is a dynamic equilibrium
of some independent process driven by some basic principles describing fluxes of
individuals between those roles. We can use our framework to extend the static
reasoning to the dynamical case where distribution of roles varies in time. In
this case we should describe the respective dynamics for both strategies and the
evolution of the distribution of states for each strategy.
5 Derivation of the replicator dynamics with ex-
plicit dynamics of fluxes between states
We have two states: Donor and Receiver. We will extend our dynamics by
explicit intensities of switching between roles described by Λi for intensity of
leaving role i and taking the opposite role. Note that the parameters Λi may be
not constants but functions of the actual distribution of roles in the population
described by g1q
1
1 + (1− g1)q12 , however for simplicity we will not describe this
explicitly in the formalism. For simplicity assume that Rb+R
1
s describes overall
Malthusian growth rate (sum of the density dependent background fitness and
focal game payoffs) for strategy s in role 1. Then the growth equation for
strategy s in role 1 can be described as:
n˙1s = n
1
s
[
Rb +R
1
s − Λ1
]
+ n2sΛ
2 (30)
= n1s
[
Rb +R
1
s +
n2s
n1s
Λ2 − Λ1
]
. (31)
We will use the multipopulation approach to replicator dynamics (Argasinski
2006, 2012, 2013), where population can be decomposed into subpopulations
described by their own replicator dynamics. Then subsystems describing sub-
populations are completed by additional set of replicator equations describing
the dynamics of proportions of all subpopulations. Then we can describe the
distribution of states among s-strategists in related frequencies qis = n
i
s/
∑
j n
j
s.
In the special case where for all strategies we have only two states, the above
system reduces to the single equation. In addition it can be simplified by ap-
plication of well known form of replicator dynamics for two strategies, but in
our case applied not for strategies but for separate roles among carriers of some
strategy, described by superscript
q˙1s = q
1
s(1− q1s)
[
M1s −M2s
]
where
M1s = Rb +R
1
s +
n2s
n1s
Λ2 − Λ1 and M2s = Rb +R2s +
n1s
n2s
Λ2 − Λ1.
Then the background growth rate Rb will cancel out. The terms describing the
switching dynamics in (31) expressed in terms of frequencies qis = n
i
s/
(
n1s + n
2
s
)
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will have forms
nzs
nis
Λ2 − Λ1 =
(
1− q1s
)
q1s
Λ2 − Λ1.
Then the separate external bracketed term describing the switching dynamics
will be:
q1s
(
1− q1s
)([(1− q1s)
q1s
Λ2 − Λ1
]
−
[
q1s
(1− q1s)
Λ1 − Λ2
])
=
((
1− q1s
) [(
1− q1s
)
Λ2 − q1sΛ1
]
+ q1s
[(
1− q1s
)
Λ2 − q1sΛ1
])
=
(
1− q1s
)
Λ2s − q1sΛ1s
Then the equation describing the dynamics of distribution of roles will be:
q˙1s = q
1
s(1− q1s)
[
R1s −R2s
]
+
[(
1− q1s
)
Λ2 − q1sΛ1
]
. (32)
Now we can describe the selection of strategies by application of the multi-
population replicator dynamics approach. Then the above system should be
completed by the additional set of the replicator equations describing the rela-
tive frequencies of the other strategies. Obviously the dynamics of state changes
will not have direct impact on the strategy frequencies (as well as on the pop-
ulation size) since it don’t changes the number of strategy carriers. Then we
have the following system describing the selection:
g˙1 = g1(1− g1)
[
R¯1(q1)− R¯2(q2)
]
(33)
where
R¯s(qs) = q
1
sR
1
s + (1− q1s)R2s
The above system should be completed by the equation on total population size
(the only element where background growth rate Rb is present):
n˙ = n
[
Rb + g1R¯1(q1) + (1− g1)R¯2(q2)
]
(34)
5.1 The dynamics of altruism
Now we can update our model from first part of the paper to the case describing
the dynamics of roles. For description of the rules underlying the state changes
we can use the background switching dynamics. Switching term will have form(
nRs
nDs
ΛD − ΛR
)
. Recall that we assumed that the focal interaction happens at
intensity τf which was removed by change of the timescale. We assumed that
role switching is independent of the results of the focal interaction, however
number of switches of the role in the game cannot be greater than the number
of rounds of that game (it’s make no sense). This implies that ΛD < τf and
ΛR < τf , leading to ΛD < 1 and ΛR < 1 after change of the timescale.
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In effect we will obtain the following system of growth equations:
n˙DC = n
D
C
(
Rb −
(
dDN + C
)
+
(
nRC
nDC
ΛD − ΛR
))
(35)
n˙DN = n
D
N
(
Rb − dDN +
(
nRN
nDN
ΛD − ΛR
))
(36)
n˙RC = n
R
C
(
Rb − dRC(g, q) +
(
nDC
nRC
ΛR − ΛD
))
(37)
n˙RN = nN
(
Rb − dRN (g, q) +
(
nDN
nRN
ΛR − ΛD
))
, (38)
and after substitution of dRC(g, q) (10) and d
R
N (g, q) (11) equations (37) and (38)
will be:
n˙RC = n
R
C
(
Rb − dR(N) +QrB +
(
nDC
nRC
ΛR − ΛD
))
n˙RN = nN
(
Rb − dR(N) +Q (1− r)B +
(
nDN
nRN
ΛR − ΛD
))
.
We can use the (32) for description of the switching dynamics:
q˙Ds =
((
1− qDs
)
ΛR − qDs ΛD
)− qDs (1− qDs ) [dDs (g, q)− dRs (g, q)]
leading to
q˙DC =
((
1− qDC
)
ΛR − qDCΛD
)
−qDC
(
1− qDC
) [
dDN + C −
(
dR(N)−QrB)] (39)
q˙DN =
((
1− qDN
)
ΛR − qDNΛD
)
−qDN
(
1− qDN
) [
dDN −
(
dR(N)−Q (1− r)B)] . (40)
Note that in the above equations both factors C and B have negative im-
pact. The difference is caused by negative terms [C +QrB] for Cooperators
and [Q (1− r)B] for Noncooperators. This is reasonable since Cost increases
mortality of Donors while Benefit decreases mortality of Receivers, both leading
to decrease of the relative frequency of Donors. In addition, with increase of
r > 0.5 factor B have stronger negative impact in the population of Coopera-
tors than Noncooperators. Therefore, we can expect that during the most of
the time qDC < q
D
N and this condition will hold at the equilibria if they exists.
It is clear that those dynamics will lead to the different role distributions for
different strategies. How this will affect the selection process? Let us derive the
replicator dynamics describing the selection of the strategies:
g˙C = gC (1− gC)
(
d¯N (g, q)− d¯C(g, q)
)
. (41)
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We have
(
d¯N (g, q)− d¯C(g, q)
)
since mortalities are negative. This leads to the
equation (see Appendix 1 for derivation):
g˙C = gC (1− gC)
[(
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
+
[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB − qDCC] . (42)
5.2 Mortality payoffs of the focal interaction
Since we have different distributions of roles for different strategies we should
modify the payoff functions accordingly. Then the number of Receivers per
single cooperating Donor (analogous to (4)) will be
O =
gN
(
1− qDN
)
+ gC
(
1− qDC
)
gCqDC
The probability of being helped, analogous to (5) will be
Q =

x
O
=
gCq
D
C
gC
(
1− qDC
)
+ (1− gC)
(
1− qDN
)x if x
O
< 1,
1 if
x
O
≥ 1
In the case when Cooperators follow themselves and help their companions with
probability pg, we will have
Q =

pg + (1− pg) gCq
D
C
gC
(
1− qDC
)
+ (1− gC)
(
1− qDN
)x if x
O
< 1,
1 if
x
O
≥ 1
.
6 Impact of the switching dynamics on the se-
lection
Recall the equations (39) and (40)
q˙DC =
((
1− qDC
)
ΛR − qDCΛD
)
−qDC
(
1− qDC
) [
dDN + C −
(
dR(N)−QrB)]
q˙DN =
((
1− qDN
)
ΛR − qDNΛD
)
−qDN
(
1− qDN
) [
dDN −
(
dR(N)−Q (1− r)B)] .
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If we assume constant switching rates Λ then in the absence of mortality terms,
parameter qDs will converge to q
D
s =
ΛR
ΛD + ΛR
. The different mortality terms
will lead to different values of this parameter. The difference is caused by
negative terms C + QrB for Cooperators and Q (1− r)B for Noncooperators,
both multiplied by qDs
(
1− qDs
)
. For positive impact of the basal mortality on
the growth of Cooperators in equation (42) we need condition qDC − qDN > 0 to
be satisfied. qDC > q
D
N when C +QrB < Q (1− r)B leading to condition
[(1− r)− r]QB > C. (43)
which is in some sense opposite inequality to condition (19) where probability of
helping the Cooperator was replaced by probability of helping the Noncoopera-
tor. Comparing them, (19) can be presented as [r−(1−r)]QB−C > 0 while (43)
as [r−(1−r)]QB+C < 0 Therefore switching dynamics affecting the basal mor-
talities acts antagonistically on the impact of the strategic outcomes described
by cost C and benefits B. This is logical since cooperative action towards other
Cooperator decreases mortality of Receiver Cooperators and increases mortality
of Donor Cooperators. in effect fraction of Donors among Cooperators should
decrease. On the other hand selfish Noncooperating Donors don’t take risk of
helping others and keeping their mortality on the lowest possible level while
receiving help from Cooperators as Receivers which decreases their Receiver
mortality.
Thus we have two antagonistic mechanisms, one driven by differences in
direct demographic outcomes of the performed strategy and second driven by
resulting changes of compositions of the subpopulations of carriers of the par-
ticular strategies. We can imagine situation when parameters Λ are different
for different strategies. It is possible that switch of the state depends on the
focal interaction and surviving Receivers can switch to be Donors with some
conditional probability, while Donors can become Receivers. This is possible
in the situation of sharing resources with individual that cannot forage due to
infection. Support from Cooperators can allow infected individual to survive
till recovery. On the other hand Donor not only decreases his survival due
to the cost but interaction with infected individual may also lead to infection
and change of the role to Receiver. Then switching events will occur with the
same intensity than focal interaction and the switching rates will be intensities
ΛDs = τ
f (1− dDs )pDs and ΛR = τf (1− dR)pR where pD and pR are conditional
probabilities of leaving the state resulting from the focal interaction. Therefore,
different mechanisms can lead to differences in distributions of states between
strategies. Framework from the paper assumes that the focal interaction occurs
at the constant rate τf , thus the fraction of the population involved in it is
constant. However, this reasoning can be extended and incorporated into more
detailed general infection model where the dynamics of the infected fraction
may depend on the state of the population. Then the focal interaction rate τf
from (2) will describe the new infection cases and may be the function of the
actual fraction of infected individuals and should be associated by ΛDs and Λ
R
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for detailed description of the dynamics of the infection spread. This is another
question for the future work, in addition to the problem of transition from co-
operating groups to the general cooperative population. More technical topics
for future work are analysis of the cases when switch between roles depends
on the focal interaction and the intensity of focal interaction depends on the
population state as in the case of helping the infected Receiver.
7 The general rule for cooperation
Therefore from the condition
(
d¯N (g, q)− d¯C(g, q)
)
> 0 from (41) we can derive
the rule for the increase of Cooperation describing the relationships between
Cost and Benefit. From the bracketed term from (42) we have that it will be
[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB + (qDN − qDC ) (dDN − dR(N)) > qDCC, (44)
Depending on the actual distributions of states the term
(
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
can be negative or positive. Note that for qDC = q
D
N above formula reduces to
the classical rule (21). We can express
(
dDN − dR(N)
)
(and in effect the whole
(44)) in terms of differences in mortalities used in the cost vs benefit calcu-
lus. Thus we should interpret the factor dDN − dR(N). Obviously we have that
dDN < d
R(N). In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the mortality of Non-
cooperator in the role of Donor should be equal or smaller that the mortality
of the Receiver receiving help, since doing nothing cannot be more dangerous
than being rescued. This leads to
dDN ≤ dR(C) = dR(N)−B
leading to
B ≤ S = dR(N)− dDN > 0,
in effect (
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
=
(
qDC − qDN
)
S,
which means that if fraction of safe individuals of the particular strategy is
greater then the opposite strategy then the respective mortality will be smaller.
Therefore the parameter S is simply a benefit from not being in trouble (which
means the role of Receiver). Therefore (44) can be presented in the form[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB + (qDC − qDN)S > qDCC, (45)
Since dDN = d
D
C −C parameter S can be presented as S = QB +D+C (see
Fig. 1 for the meaning of these parameters). Then dDN = d
R(N)−QB−D−C
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Figure 1:
and thus D can be interpreted as the efficiency of the sacrifice of the cooperating
Donor in increasing the survival of the Receiver to the level of the safe individual.
Therefore D in addition to the cost C, saved by Noncooperator, can be termed
the ”selfishness bonus”, since it will be consumed by noncooperative donors
and cannot be transferred to the helped Receiver. Then equation (45) can be
presented as[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB + (qDC − qDN) [QB +D + C] > qDCC,
together with (43) leading to the general rule for cooperation expressed in
terms of B,C and D:
[(
1− qDN
)
r − (1− qDC ) (1− r)]QB + (qDC − qDN)D > qDNC. (46)
and(
qDC − qDN
)
D < 0 when [(1− r)− r]QB < C(
qDC − qDN
)
D > 0 when [(1− r)− r]QB > C.
It seems to be little bit counterintuitive, but if we expand it to show differences
between contributions for both strategies we obtain
qDCD −
(
1− qDC
)
(1− r)QB > qDN (D + C)−
(
1− qDN
)
rQB,
where qDCD and q
D
N (D+C) are Donor average mortalities weighted by fractions
of Donors for both strategies and
(
1− qDC
)
(1 − r)QB is the Cooperators loss
caused by wrong recognition of Cooperative Receiver, while
(
1− qDN
)
rQB is
Noncooperators loss caused by correct recognition by Cooperative Donor.
7.1 Case of D < 0
Negative D may occur when C +B > S, which means that changes in mortal-
ities caused by altruistic action overlap and in effect they invert the inequality
between mortalities of Donor and Receiver (this is depicted on Fig. 2).
21
Figure 2:
Then D can be termed sacrifice bonus since it acts negatively and the
general rule for cooperation has the form
[(
1− qDN
)
r − (1− qDC ) (1− r)]QB + (qDC − qDN)D > qDNC. (47)
and (48)(
qDC − qDN
)
D > 0 when [(1− r)− r]QB < C (49)(
qDC − qDN
)
D < 0 when [(1− r)− r]QB > C, (50)
therefore (49) shows that the impact of D is positive when [r − (1− r)]QB > C
(19) is satisfied, however it will be positive even if [r − (1− r)]QB > −C.
7.2 Case of D = 0
Note that for D = 0 it will have form(
1− qDN
)
r − (1− qDC ) (1− r)
qDN
QB > C (51)
Impact of the benefit is positive when
(
1− qDC
)
r− (1− qDN) (1− r) > 0 leading
to
r >
(
1− qDN
)(
1− qDC
)
+
(
1− qDN
) = qRN
qRC + q
R
N
Depending on the parameter values, condition (51) may be weaker or stronger
than rule (19). It will be weaker or equivalent when(
1− qDN
)
r − (1− qDC ) (1− r)
qDN
≤ r − (1− r),
leading to the condition
r ≤ r∗ = 1− q
D
N − qDC
2− 3qDN − qDC
, (52)
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where r∗ is the manifold where both conditions (51) and (19) are equivalent.
Numerator is negative if qDC > 1 − qDN and on the line qDC = 1 − qDN we have
r∗ = 0. Denominator is negative if qDC > 2 − 3qDN and qDC = 2 − 3qDN is the
singular surface. Manifold where r∗ = 1 is the line qDN = 1/2 It intersects with
the singular surface at qDC = 1/2. Summarizing, the negative value of r
∗ is
possible when only numerator or only denominator is negative
1− qDN < qDC < 3qDN − 1 for qDN < 0.5
and
3qDN − 1 < qDC < 1− qDN for qDN > 0.5.
In addition (51) will be always weaker than (19) (r∗ > 1) when
qDC > 3q
D
N − 1 for qDN < 0.5 and qDC < 3qDN − 1 for qDN > 0.5,
in other case (r∗ < 0) the rule for cooperation will be always stronger than (19)
(see Figure 3 and Figure 4 for plot of the surface r∗).
Therefore conditions for cooperation are highly affected by the dynamics of
the distribution of states. In addition we have trade-off between cost and ben-
efits resulting from the cooperative action and the changes of basal mortalities
((56) and (57) in Appendix 1) caused by impact of the focal interaction on the
equilibria of the switching dynamics (represented by term
(
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
in equation (44)) leading to the third parameter S (and in effect D). Summa-
rizing, we obtain formula expressed in terms of Benefit, Cost and the Self-
ishness/Sacrifice Bonus. The last parameter can describe important biological
factors. Selfishness/Sacrifice Bonus can occur in many types of problems for
example in engaging in the fight to save other individual. Passive individual
will be safer than all individuals involved in the fight. For example, in the
mentioned in the beginning problem of predator warning signal it may be zero
because selfish individual that spotted predator will hide, thus it will behave as
individuals warned by Cooperator. However, we can imagine the cases, where
hidden Noncooperator may have greater survival when all other individuals are
exposed and attract the attention of the predator, than in case when everybody
are hidden and have the same risk of being catched. The above formula takes
into account the asymmetry in the distribution of roles. The values of qRC and
qRN can be calculated from the equilibria of the equations (39,40). Note that
rule for cooperation (46) in the cases when Q < 1 will have more complicated
form and it will depend on the cooperative gene frequency gC .
7.3 The kin selection case
Recall from the previous sections that in the case of kin selection r is replaced
by pC and (1− r) by pN (23), and since cooperators will pay the cost only for
their kins. Thus, in the switching dynamics (39,40) the terms C + QrB and
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Figure 3: Diagram describing the role allocations for different strategies
when new rule for cooperation is always stronger/weaker (is satisfied for
greater/smaller r) or may be either smaller, greater or equivalent.
Q (1− r)B should be replaced by C + pCQB for Cooperators and pNQB for
Noncooperators. The equivalent of (43) will be C < [pN − pC ]QB (C > rkQB).
Therefore, (46) will be[
pC(1− qDN )− pN (1− qDC )
]
QB +
(
qDC − qDN
)
D > qDCC, (53)
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Figure 4: Plot of the surface r∗ where new rule for cooperation is equivalent to
the classical rule (works for the same parameter r.
leading to[
rk(1− qDN ) + (1− rk)gC
(
qDC − qDN
)]
QB +
(
qDC − qDN
)
D > qDCC.
In the absence of the selfishness bonus (D = 0) the above formula simplifies to
rk(1− qDN ) + (1− rk)
(
qDC − qDN
)
gC
qDC
QB > C.
It can be presented in the form expressing the impact of parameter rk
rk
[
1− (qDN (1− gC) + qDC gC)]+ (qDC − qDN) gC
qDC
QB > C.
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Therefore, even in the case of Q = 1 the success depends on the frequency of
cooperators in the population described by gC . Only in the case when q
D
N = q
D
C
the above formula reduces to the Hamilton’s rule (29).
8 Discussion
Summarizing, in this paper we expressed the basic classic results on Inclusive
Fitness and Kin Selection in the simplified form related to the Event Based Ap-
proach (Argasinski and Broom 2013,2017,2018). In effect, the classical frame-
work was simplified and expressed in the measurable parameters e.g. mortality
(or survival) related to the focal type of interaction, when cooperative trait is
expressed. In addition, another important parameter was incorporated into the
framework. This parameter describes the distribution of roles Donor/Receiver
among members of the population. This leads to the general rule for positive
growth of the frequency of the cooperative strategy showing that among Re-
ceivers of the altruism should be more Cooperators than Noncooperators. This
implies the need for identification or discrimination strategies to sort out the
noncooperative individuals. In addition, if the frequency of Cooperators is low,
the Cooperators should gather together and support themselves. This mecha-
nism can be relaxed with the spread of the cooperative gene, since with increase
of the fraction of Cooperators increases the probability of meeting the Coop-
erator at random. Increase of the sizes of cooperative groups or the level of
cooperation in the whole population leads to the problem of elimination of free
riding Noncooperators. The incorporation of these mechanisms into framework
developed in this paper is the question for the future research. One of the basic
strategies is the limitation of the altruism to close kins only, which leads to the
classical Hamilton’s rule. The transition from cooperative subgroups (groups
of closely related kins at the beginning) to fully cooperative population caused
by increase of the frequency of Cooperators is another interesting question. It
is related to the transition between different types of altruism, from restrictive
kin altruism to broader forms of reciprocal altruism, leading to the cooperative
instinct towards all members of the population. This aspect should be also
incorporated into new framework.
New formulation allowed for generalization described in the second part of
the paper. The distinction between two separate outcomes of the interaction,
which are survival and change of the role, leads to the problem of the mechanisms
underlying the dynamics of role changes. This formulation is more mechanistic
than classical approaches based on abstract fitness (Geritz and Kisdi 2012) and
allows for the deeper insight into the modelled problem. It shows that the clas-
sical formulation works well for the cases when roles are independently drawn
at every focal interaction event. Good example of the problem of this type is
the classical Haldane’s dilemma describing the help for the drowning individual.
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However, in some problems this may not be the case. For example help for the
sick individual may support him with necessary supplies but may not cure him.
If this individual suffers from the infectious disease then the altruistic action
may lead to infection of the Cooperative Donor and in effect the fraction of the
strategy carriers being in trouble can increase. Important result shown by new
framework is that in those cases different strategies may have different distri-
butions of roles. These complicated cases can be described by models extended
by equations describing the role switching dynamics. Resulting equilibria of the
role distributions (if they exist) should be considered in general rule for coopera-
tion being the generalization of the classical approach leading to the Hamilton’s
rule. In effect we obtain the general condition which is affected by differences
in role distributions, which may be termed State Distribution Asymmetry. Re-
sulting condition, in addition to the classical components describing Cost and
Benefit, contains third component. This component may have different inter-
pretations depending on its value. If Cooperative Donors mortality is smaller
than the mortality of the helped Receivers then it describes the deficiency of
benefit (in addition to the compensation of cost described by classical condition)
that will be consumed by Noncooperative Donors doing nothing. That’s why it
can be termed Selfishness Bonus and it should be added to the actual cost in
the general rule for cooperation.
In the second case when Cooperative Donors mortality is greater than the
mortality of the helped Receivers this component describes the ”amount” of
Donor’s mortality ”transferred” into Receivers survival, therefore it can be
termed Sacrifice Bonus. This component is consumed by Receivers, thus it
can be subtracted from the actual cost in the general rule for cooperation.
Important aspect revealed by our model is that for derivation of the general
rule for cooperation, being equivalent to the classical conditions, existence of
the equilibria of the role dynamics is necessary. We can imagine cases with,
for example, cyclic role switching dynamics. Then the static conditions for
the selection toward altruism will be more complex and will probably contain
integrals over trajectories of the cycles describing the average role distributions
in time.
The distribution of roles resulting from the selection mechanisms may be
important tool for explanation of many biological phenomena. for example it
can play important role in evolution of the social structure and the division
of labour among social insects. This is another potential direction of future
research.
9 What is the difference between C < rB and
C < rkB?
In addition to popular fallacies (Park 2007, West et al. 2011) associated with
Hamilton’s rule, there is one popular mistake related to the relationships be-
tween inclusive fitness and kin selection concepts. The question is: Should the
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relatedness be defined as the probability that the Receiver is the carrier of the
cooperative gene or it should be also inherited from the common ancestor? This
problem was critically discussed by Gintis (2013) and can be found for example
in Bourke (2011). Also Encyclopedia Britannica states that:
”Relatedness is the probability that a gene in the potential altruist is shared
by the potential recipient of the altruistic behaviour.”
without explicit reference to genealogy. The source of the problem is fol-
lowing: For simplified case of pairwise interactions between single Donor and
Receiver when there are enough Donors for every Receiver (then Q = 1 and
qD = 0.5), the condition for positive growth C < rB (27) reduces to C <
[rk + (1− rk)gC ]B = pCB for kin selection case. On the other hand the gen-
eral condition for cooperation C < [r − (1− r)]B (28) in kin selection case
reduces to C < rkB. Note that pC describes probability that the Benefit con-
suming Donor is actually the carrier of the cooperative gene, thus it can be
interpreted as parameter r in the general inclusive fitness sense. However, since
in the inclusive fitness case Cooperators interact with kins only we have that
pN 6= 1− r. Then the relationships between r and rk can be summarized as
C < rB ' pCB =⇒ C < rkB + (1− rk)gCB.
C < [r − (1− r)]B ' [pC − pN ]B =⇒ C < rkB.
Thus, what is the difference between C < rB and C < rkB? Condition C < rB
where r is the probability that the Receiver is the carrier of the cooperative gene
(identity by state in terms of population genetics) is the condition for positive
impact of the act of altruism on the growth rate of Cooperators. thus it is
not sufficient for the spread of altruism. On the other hand, condition C <
rkB where rk is the probability that Receiver inherited cooperative gene from
the common ancestor (identity by descent) is the condition for greater growth
for Cooperators over Noncooperators. This is correct condition for altruism,
however limited to kins only. However, all above reasonings are based on the
assumption that the distribution of roles qD is constant and independent of the
outcomes of the analyzed interaction.
References:
Alger I, Weibull JW (2012)A generalization of Hamilton’s rule—Love others
how much? J Theor Biol 29942-54
Allen B (2015). Inclusive fitness theory becomes an end in itself. BioScience
65(11) 1103-1104
Allen B, Nowak MA (2016) There is no inclusive fitness at the level of the indi-
vidual. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 12 122-128
Argasinski K (2006) Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolu-
tionary games related to replicator dynamics. A metasimplex concept. Math
Biosci 202 88-114
Argasinski K (2012) The dynamics of sex ratio evolution Dynamics of global
population parameters. J Theor Biol 309 134-146
Argasinski K (2013) The Dynamics of Sex Ratio Evolution: From the Gene
28
Perspective to Multilevel Selection. PloS ONE 8(4) e60405
Argasinski K (2018) The dynamics of sex ratio evolution: the impact of males
as passive gene carriers on multilevel selection. Dyn Gam App 8(4) 671-695
Argasinski K, Broom M (2013a) Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game:
how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary
games. J Math Biol 1;67(4):935-62
Argasinski, K Broom M (2018a) Interaction rates, vital rates, background fit-
ness and replicator dynamics: how to embed evolutionary game structure into
realistic population dynamics. Theo Bio 137(1) 33-50
Argasinski K Broom M (2018b) Evolutionary stability under limited population
growth: Eco-evolutionary feedbacks and replicator dynamics. Ecol Complex 34
198-212
Birch J (2017) The inclusive fitness controversy: finding a way forward. Royal
Society open science 4(7) 170335
Cressman R (1992) The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory Springer
Doebeli M, Ispolatov Y, Simon B (2017) Point of view: Towards a mechanistic
foundation of evolutionary theory. Elife 6 e23804
Doebeli M, Hauert C (2006) Limits of Hamilton’s rule. J Evol Biol 19(5) 1386-
1388
https://www.britannica.com/science/animal-behavior/Function#ref1043131
Fletcher JA, Doebeli M (2008) A simple and general explanation for the evolu-
tion of altruism. Proc of the R Soc B: Biological Sciences 276(1654) 13-19
Fletcher JA, Zwick M, Doebel M, Wilson DS (2006) What’s wrong with inclu-
sive fitness? TREE 21(11) 597-598
Gardner A, West SA, Wild G (2011) The genetical theory of kin selection. J
Evol Biol 24(5) 1020-1043
Geritz SA , Kisdi E´ (2012) Mathematical ecology: why mechanistic models? J
Math Biol, 65(6), 1411-1415
Gintis H (2014) Inclusive fitness and the sociobiology of the genome. Biol Philos
29(4) 477-515
Grafen A (2006) Optimization of inclusive fitness. J theor Biol Feb 7;238(3):541-
63
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1988) The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Sys-
tems. Cambridge University Press
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics.
Cambridge University Press
Houston AI, McNamara J (1999) JM Models of adaptive behaviour: an ap-
proach based on state. Cambridge University Press;
Houston AI, McNamara J (2005) John Maynard Smith and the importance of
consistency in evolutionary game theory. Biol Phil 20(5) 933-950
Hauert C, Holmes M, Doebeli M (2006) Evolutionary games and population
dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proc R Soc B:
Biological Sciences 273(1600) pp.2565–2570
Hauert C, Wakano JY, Doebeli M, (2008) Ecological public goods games: co-
operation and bifurcation. Theor Pop Biol 73(2) pp.257–263
Marshall JA (2015) Social evolution and inclusive fitness theory: an introduc-
29
tion. Princeton University Press
Marshall JA (2016) What is inclusive fitness theory, and what is it for? Current
Opinion in behavioral Sciences 12 103-108
Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press Cambbridge, United Kingdom
McElreath R, Boyd R (2008) Mathematical models of social evolution: A guide
for the perplexed. University of Chicago Press
Kramer J, Meunier J (2016) Kin and multilevel selection in social evolution: a
never-ending controversy? F1000Research, 5
McNamara JM (2013) Towards a richer evolutionary game theory. J Roy Soc
Interface 10(88) 20130544
Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314(5805)
1560-1563
Nowak MA, Tarnita, CE, Wilson EO (2010) The evolution of eusociality. Na-
ture, 466(7310) 1057
Nowak M A , McAvoy A , Allen B, Wilson EO (2017) The general form of
Hamilton’s rule makes no predictions and cannot be tested empirically. PNAS
114(22) 5665-5670
Okasha S, Martens J (2016) The causal meaning of Hamilton’s rule. R Soc
Open Science 3(3) 160037
Park JH (2007) Persistent misunderstandings of inclusive fitness and kin selec-
tion: Their ubiquitous appearance in social psychology textbooks. Evol Psychol
5(4) 147470490700500414
Rousset F, Lion S (2011) Much ado about nothing: Nowak et al.’s charge against
inclusive fitness theory. J Evol Biol 24(6) 1386-1392
Roff DA (2008) Defining fitness in evolutionary models. J Genet 87 339–348
Metz JAJ (2008) Fitness. In: Jørgensen SE, Fath BD (Eds.) Evolutionary
Ecology. In: Encyclopedia of Ecology vol. 2 Elsevier pp. 1599–1612
Van Veelen M (2009) Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation:
when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong. J Theor Biol Aug
7;259(3):589-600
Van Veelen M, Allen B, Hoffman M, Simon B, Veller C (2017) Hamilton’s rule.
J Theor Biol 414 176-230
Wenseleers T (2006) Modelling social evolution: the relative merits and limita-
tions of a Hamilton’s rule-based approach. J Evol Biol 19(5) 1419-1422
West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A (2007) Social semantics: altruism, cooperation,
mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J Evol Biol 20(2) 415-432
West SA, El Mouden C, Gardner A (2011) Sixteen common misconceptions
about the evolution of cooperation in humans. Evol Hum Beh 32(4), 231-262
Appendix 1
Let us derive the bracketed term
(
d¯N (g, q)− d¯C(g, q)
)
from (42) where
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d¯C(g, q) = q
D
C
(
dDN + C
)
+
(
1− qDC
) (
dR(N)−QrB)
and
d¯N (g, q) = q
D
Nd
D
N +
(
1− qDN
) (
dR(N)−Q (1− r)B) ,
above payoffs can be presented as
d¯C(g, q) = d˜C(qC)−
(
1− qDC
)
QrB + qDCC (54)
and
d¯N (g, q) = d˜N (qN )−
(
1− qDN
)
Q (1− r)B, (55)
where
d˜C(qC) = q
D
C d
D
N +
(
1− qDC
)
dR(N) (56)
d˜N (qN ) = q
D
Nd
D
N +
(
1− qDN
)
dR(N) (57)
describe the different basal average mortalities (in addition to the impact of
strategic parameters C and B) caused by distributions of states for both strate-
gies and
d˜N (qN )− d˜C(qC) =
(
qDN − qDC
)
dDN +
[(
1− qDN
)− (1− qDC )] dR(N)
=
(
qDC − qDN
) (
dR(N)− dDN
)
, (58)
in effect
d¯N (g, q)− d¯C(g, q) =
d˜N (qN )− d˜C(qC)−
(
1− qDN
)
Q (1− r)B + (1− qDC )QrB − qDCC =(
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
+
[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB − qDCC (59)
leading to the equation on selection of the strategies (42)
g˙C = gC (1− gC)
[(
qDN − qDC
) (
dDN − dR(N)
)
+
[(
1− qDC
)
r − (1− qDN) (1− r)]QB − qDCC] (60)
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